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David Wallace∗
I address the problem of indefiniteness in quantum mechanics: the
problem that the theory, without changes to its formalism, seems
to predict that macroscopic quantities have no definite values. The
Everett interpretation is often criticised along these lines and I shall
argue that much of this criticism rests on a false dichotomy: that the
macroworld must either be written directly into the formalism or be
regarded as somehow illusory. By means of analogy with other areas
of physics, I develop the view that the macroworld is instead to be
understood in terms of certain structures and patterns which emerge
from quantum theory (given appropriate dynamics, in particular de-
coherence). I extend this view to the observer, and in doing so make
contact with functionalist theories of mind.
Keywords: Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics — Everett inter-
pretation; Preferred Basis; Decoherence; Emergence
1 The measurement problem
A simple way to think about the quantum measurement problem is as follows:
1. The formalism of quantum mechanics describes the evolution of a mathe-
matical object called the wave-function. By analogy with classical physics,
the natural move is to treat this wave-function as directly representing a
real thing, making it analogous to the phase-space point representing a set
of particles, or to the vector field representing a state of the electromag-
netic field. (The alternative of treating the wave-function as some sort of
probability distribution — analogously to classical statistical mechanics
— turns out to be untenable, at least without further modification of the
theory.1)
1There is a ‘statistical’ or ‘ensemble’ interpretation of quantum mechanics, discussed by (for
instance) Ballentine (1990) and Taylor (1986), which does attempt to take the wave-function
as just giving the statistical distribution of outcomes from a large number of measurements;
I find it difficult to see how this interpretation manages to avoid both commitment to some
unknown hidden-variables theory on the one-hand, or outright anti-realism on the other, but
this is not the place for such a debate.
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2. Taking this view of the wave-function when it is used to describe micro-
scopic objects like atoms or molecules leads us to the conclusion that these
objects often do not have definite values of properties — such as spin or
position — which classically we would expect to be definite. This ‘super-
position’ of properties implies a very weird view of the microworld, but
since that world is not directly observable such weirdness is not (yet) a
problem.2
3. However, the detailed dynamics of the quantum wavefunction (specifically,
linearity and entanglement) imply that this microscopic indefiniteness in-
evitably leads to indefiniteness at the everyday level — so that pointers
sometimes do not have definite positions, and cats sometimes are not
definitely alive or dead. This is not merely “weird” but apparently patho-
logical.
At first sight, the obvious move seems to be to modify the theory itself: to
change either the dynamics, or the assumption that reality is fully represented
by the wave-function. Everett’s contribution to the debate was to challenge
this ‘obvious’ strategy and to take seriously the idea of superpositions at the
macroscopic level. The gain of doing so would be significant: the simple and
elegant mathematical structure of quantum theory would be left intact; there
would be no need to postulate ad hoc modifications of the dynamics, no need to
add extra elements to the theory which play no part in its practical applications,
and no conflict with relativity.
But Everett’s strategy must obviously overcome major problems. The idea of
an indeterminate macroworld seems either meaningless or just plain contradicted
by observations: what could it mean to say objects have indefinite position? And
even if it does mean anything, surely you only have to look at them to see that
their positions are definite?
The goal of this paper is to show how these problems can be resolved, with-
out compromising the mathematical structure of quantum theory. The approach
which I shall advocate is based upon decoherence theory, and very much upon
the lines of the recent versions of the Everett interpretation proposed by Gell-
Mann and Hartle (1990), Saunders (1998), Zurek (1998), and others; in section
2 I contrast this sort of approach to Everett with earlier versions which modify
the mathematical formalism or introduce an explicit role for consciousness. In
section 3 I shall argue that the conceptual criticisms of the decoherence-based
approach (I don’t discuss the more technical objections) are based upon a false
dichotomy (that either the macroscopic world is written directly into the quan-
tum formalism or it is simply an illusion), and in section 4 I shall defend a view
of macroscopic objects which avoids this dichotomy, based on work by Dennett
2At least, there is no epistemic problem; however, it might be argued that — pending an
understanding of what (for instance) indefiniteness of position actually means— our theory is
simply incoherent as a physical theory. This suggests, as argued recently by Tappenden (2000,
2002), that we may need to introduce “many-worlds” talk at the microphysical level, before
any consideration of macroscopic ontology. For my own attempt to develop this approach
without having to change the quantum-mechanical formalism, see Wallace (2001b).
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(primarily Dennett 1991b). In sections 5–7 I apply this view to quantum me-
chanics, first to Schro¨dinger’s cat and then, in section 7, to human observers.
In the latter section I will make contact with the functionalist program in phi-
losophy of mind, which fits very naturally into my framework; at the end of the
section I briefly discuss the problem of probability in Everett interpretations, al-
though for the most part I treat probability as a separate foundational problem
lying largely outside the scope of this paper.
2 Recovering macroscopic definiteness
Traditionally there have been two approaches taken to avoiding the problems
of macroscopic indefiniteness mentioned above, whilst preserving the attractive
features of Everett’s strategy; these are now usually referred to as the “Many



















∣∣∣∣ observer detectsno decay
〉)
which prima facie is an indefinite state in which neither the detection appa-
ratus nor the observer are definite. The many-worlds strategy interprets the two
terms in this superposition as representing two (or possibly two families of) dis-
tinct macroscopic worlds — hence the universal state represents a multiplicity
of worlds, each one of which is macroscopically definite.
The many-minds strategy, on the other hand, accepts that (1) is indefinite,
and attempts to recover not definiteness but just the appearance of definiteness.
This is done by associating different mental phenomena to each of the “observer”
terms in (1), so that associated with each (macroscopically indefinite) brain is a
large number of definite minds. Each mind sees one term in the superposition,
so that to the minds the world appears definite even though it is not.
However, in both of these approaches, it seems that we have to add something
to the underlying theory. In the many-worlds case we seem to have to specify a
particular Hilbert-space basis (the so-called “preferred basis”) to define worlds,
and to explain why the wave-function is to be decomposed in one way rather
than another. Also, if the world-decomposition is defined in terms of a basis
then there would seem to be no fact of the matter as to which world at time t2
is identical to (or the successor of, etc.) a given world at time t1. This creates
pressure to add another piece of structure, some sort of “connection rule” linking
up worlds across time.3
Arguably (and controversially! — see Lockwood (1996) for a defence) many-
minds theories avoid the need to add a preferred basis to the quantum formal-
3This problem is discussed by, for example, Butterfield (1996); see also Barrett (1999),
from whom I borrow the “connection rule” terminology.
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ism, but they do so at the price of requiring a very close connection between
fundamental physics and the philosophy of mind — effectively transferring the
problem of selecting a basis onto our theory of mind and requiring that theory
to be explicitly quantum-mechanical. The requirement for a “connection rule”
to handle transtemporal identity seems just as strong for many-minds theories
as for many-worlds theories: how are we to link up definite experiences at time
t1 with those at time t2?
Theories can be constructed which provide this extra structure (a number
are discussed in Barrett 1999) but the additions to the formalism seem to count
against the very reasons which led us to consider Everett’s strategy in the first
place: the new structure is ad hoc in the sense that it is usually quite un-
derdetermined by observable data, and almost inevitably spoils the relativistic
covariance of the theory.
From the 1980s onwards, decoherence theory has often been cited as part
of the solution to this problem of definiteness. The technical details of this ap-
proach shall not concern us here, but the basic idea is that dynamical processes
cause a preferred basis to emerge rather than having to be specified a priori —
here we can understand ‘emerge’ in the sense that interference between processes
described by separate terms of the preferred basis is negligible. (See Zurek 1991
for details.)
Two sorts of objection can be raised against the decoherence approach to
definiteness. The first is purely technical: will decoherence really lead to a
preferred basis in physically realistic situations, and will that preferred basis
be one in which macroscopic objects have at least approximate definiteness?
Evaluating the progress made in establishing this would be beyond the scope of
this paper, but there is good reason to be optimistic.
The other sort of objection is more conceptual in nature: it is the claim
that even if the technical success of the decoherence program is assumed, it
will not be enough to solve the problem of indefiniteness. This is because the
decoherence process is only approximate: the preferred basis is very accurately
specified but not given exactly, and the interference between terms, though very
small, is not zero. Furthermore, for this reason the program does not apparently
help with the problem of giving an exact criterion for transtemporal identity.
It is this second, conceptual, objection that I wish to address in the remain-
der of this paper.
3 The fallacy of exactness
The objection above arises from a view implicit in much discussion of Everett-
style interpretations: that certain concepts and objects in quantum mechanics
must either enter the theory formally in its axiomatic structure, or be regarded
as illusions. Consider, for instance, Kent’s influential (1990) critique of Many-
Worlds interpretations:
It’s certainly true that phase information loss is a dynamical process
which needs no axiomatic formulation. However, this is irrelevant
to our very simple point: no preferred basis can arise, from the
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dynamics or from anything else, unless some basis selection rule
is given. Of course, [Many-Worlds Interpretation] proponents can
attempt to frame such a rule in terms of a dynamical quantity - for
example, some measure of phase information loss. But an explicit,
precise rule is needed. (p.11; page numbering refers to the internet
version.)
In other words, a preferred basis must either be written into the quantum-
mechanical axioms, or no such basis can exist — the idea of some approximate,
emergent preferred basis is not acceptable. The paper goes on to make a similar
point about ‘worlds’:
...one can perhaps intuitively view the corresponding components [of
the wave function] as describing a pair of independent worlds. But
this intuitive interpretation goes beyond what the axioms justify: the
axioms say nothing about the existence of multiple physical worlds
corresponding to wave function components. (p.11)
Analogous objections are raised about transtemporal identity: Barrett’s recent
(1999) book gives an example.
In so far as one lacks a notion of the identity of a world over time
(and thus, no notion of the identity of an observer over time), the
splitting-worlds theory is thus empirically incoherent... But if one
adds a connection rule to the theory, then this further (because one
also needs to chose a preferred basis) detracts from the theory’s
simplicity. (p.162)
Barrett’s quote implies that we face the same dichotomy: either there is some
precise truth about transtemporal identity which must written into the basic
formalism of quantum mechanics, or there are simply no facts at all about the
past of a given world, or a given observer. (This seems to be what motivates
Bell (1981) to say that in the Everett interpretation the past is an illusion.)
I will argue that in defending any worthwhile version of the Everett inter-
pretation, we should reject this view. My claim is instead that the emergence of
a classical world from quantum mechanics is to be understood in terms of the
emergence from the theory of certain sorts of structures and patterns, and that
this means that we have no need (as well as no hope!) of the precision which
Kent and others here demand.
Before developing this account, I shall briefly address what might appear to
be a looming threat to any such approach. The problem of macroscopic indefi-
niteness is (in part) how we can understand the quantum state as simultaneously
describing two macro-objects (A and B, say) with contradictory properties (such
as being an alive cat, versus being a dead one). Introducing ‘many worlds’ at
the level of formalism, for all its disadvantages, certainly solves this problem,
for then A and B are simply distinct objects. If however, we adopt any account
in which A and B each supervene on properties of the micro-world’s ontology
(say, P and Q), then if A and B have contradictory properties then surely P
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and Q must themselves be contradictory, and to avoid incoherence we appear
to be forced back onto the explicit introduction of ‘many worlds’ at the level of
the micro-ontology.
There is a flaw in this argument, however. If A and B have contradictory
properties then P and Q must certainly be different properties, but it does
not follow that they should have to be contradictory. The underlying micro-
ontology is (faithfully represented by) the quantum state, and that state has a
far richer set of properties than any classical state (as can be seen, for instance,
from a position-basis viewpoint, where the quantum state of the Universe is
represented as a function over an enormously high-dimensional configuration
space, rather than the paltry three dimensions over which any classical field is
defined). If A and B are to be ‘live cat’ and ‘dead cat’ then P and Q will be
described by statements about the state vector which (expressed in a position
basis) will concern the wave-function’s amplitude in vastly separated regions
RP and RQ of configuration space, and there will be no contradiction between
these statements.
4 Understanding higher-order ontology
To see why it is reasonable to reject the dichotomy of the previous section,
consider that in science there are many examples of objepts which are certainly
real, but which are not directly represented in the axioms. A dramatic example
of such an object is the tiger: tigers are unquestionably real in any reasonable
sense of the word, but they are certainly not part of the basic ontology of any
physical theory. A tiger, instead, is to be understood as a pattern or structure
in the physical state.
To see how this works in practice, consider how we could go about studying,
say, tiger hunting patterns. In principle — but only in principle — the most
reliable way to make predictions about these would be in terms of atoms and
electrons, applying molecular dynamics directly to the swirl of molecules which
make up tigers and their environment. In practice, however, this is clearly
insane: no remotely imaginable computer would be able to solve the 1035 or so
simultaneous dynamical equations which would be needed to predict what the
tigers would do, and even if such a computer could exist its calculations could
not remotely be said to explain their behaviour.
A more effective strategy can be found by studying the structures observ-
able at the multi-trillion-molecule level of description of this ‘swirl of molecules’.
At this level, we will observe robust — though not 100% reliable — regulari-
ties, which will give us an alternative description of the tiger in a language of
cells and molecules. The principles by which these cells and molecules inter-
act will be derivable from the underlying microphysics, and will involve various
assumptions and approximations; hence very occasionally they will be found
to fail. Nonetheless, this slight riskiness in our description is overwhelmingly
worthwhile given the enormous gain in usefulness of this new description: the
language of cell biology is both explanatorily far more powerful, and practically
far more useful, than the language of physics for describing tiger behaviour.
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Nonetheless it is still ludicrously hard work to study tigers in this way. To
reach a really practical level of description, we again look for patterns and
regularities, this time in the behaviour of the cells that make up individual
tigers (and other living creatures which interact with them). In doing so we will
reach yet another language, that of zoology and evolutionary adaptationism,
which describes the system in terms of tigers, deer, grass, camouflage and so on.
This language is, of course, the norm in studying tiger hunting patterns, and
another (in practice very modest) increase in the riskiness of our description is
happily accepted in exchange for another phenomenal rise in explanatory power
and practical utility.
Of course, talk of zoology is grounded in cell biology, and cell biology in
molecular physics, but we cannot discard the tools and terms of zoology to
work directly with physics, without (a) losing explanatory power, and (b) taking
forever.
What moral should we draw from this mildly fanciful example? That higher-
level ontology is to be understood in terms of pattern or structure: in a slogan,
A tiger is any pattern which behaves as a tiger.
More precisely, what we have is a criterion for which patterns are to be
regarded as real, which we might call Dennett’s criterion (in recognition of a
very similar view proposed by Dennett 1991b4).
Dennett’s Criterion: A macro-object is a pattern, and the ex-
istence of a pattern as a real thing depends on the usefulness —
in particular, the explanatory power and predictive reliability — of
theories which admit that pattern in their ontology.
Dennett’s own favourite example is worth describing briefly in order to show
the ubiquity of this way of thinking: if I have a computer running a chess
program, I can in principle predict its next move by analysing the electrical
flow through its circuitry, but I have no chance of doing this in practice, and
anyway it will give me virtually no understanding of that move. I can achieve
a vastly more effective method of predictions if I know the program and am
prepared to take the (very small) risk that it is not being correctly implemented
by the computer, but even this method will be practically very difficult to use.
One more vast improvement can be gained if I don’t concern myself with the
details of the program, but simply assume that whatever they are, they cause
the computer to play good chess. Thus I move successively from a language of
electrons and silicon chips, through one of program steps, to one of intentions,
beliefs, plans and so forth — each time trading a small increase in risk for an
enormous increase in predictive and explanatory power.5
4Amore restricted proposal of this sort (applying specifically to intentional systems, such as
the chess computer example given here) was made by Dennett significantly earlier, in Dennett
(1971). Though the more general view is implicit in many of Dennett’s earlier writings it does
not seem to have been states explicitly prior to the (1991b) paper I cite.
5It is, of course, highly contentious to suppose that a chess-playing computer really believes,
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Why is it reasonable to claim, in examples like these, that higher-level de-
scriptions are explanatorily more powerful than lower-level ones? In other words,
granted that a prediction from microphysics is in practice impossible, if we had
such a prediction why wouldn’t it count as a good explanation? To some ex-
tent I’m inclined to say that this is just obvious — anyone who really believes
that a description of the trajectories followed by the molecular constituents of
a tiger explains why that tiger eats a deer means something very different by
‘explanation’. But possibly a more satisfying reason is that the higher-level
theory to some extent ‘floats free’ of the lower-level one, in the sense that it
doesn’t care how its patterns are instantiated provided that they are instanti-
ated. (Hence a zoological account of tigers requires us to assume that they are
carnivorous, have certain strengths and weaknesses, and so on, but doesn’t care
what their internal makeup is.) So an explanation in terms of the lower-level
theory contains an enormous amount of extraneous noise which is irrelevant to
a description in terms of higher-level patterns. See Putnam (1975) for further
description of this point.
This approach to higher-order ontology applies to physics itself as well as to
theories other than physics, as illustrated by one further example: that of quasi-
particles. To understand these, consider vibrations in a (quantum-mechanical)
crystal. These can in principle be described entirely in terms of the individ-
ual crystal atoms and their quantum entanglement with one another — but
it turns out to be overwhelmingly more useful to think in terms of ‘phonons’
i. e. collective excitations of the crystal which behave like ‘real’ particles in most
respects.
This sort of thing is ubiquitous in solid-state physics, and the collective
excitations are called ‘quasi-particles’ — so crystal vibrations are described in
terms of phonons, waves in the magnetisation direction of a ferromagnet in terms
of magnons, collective electron waves in a plasma in terms of plasmons, and so
on. But are quasi-particles real? Well, they can be created and annihilated;
they can be detected (by, for instance, scattering them off ‘real’ particles like
neutrons); in some cases (such as so-called ‘ballistic’ phonons) their time-of-
flight can be measured; and they play a crucial explanatory role in solid-state
theories.6 We have no more evidence than this that ‘real’ particles exist, so it
seems absurd to deny the existence of the quasi-particles.
But when exactly, you might ask, are quasi-particles present? This ques-
tion has no precise answer. It is essential in a quasi-particle formulation of a
solid-state problem7 that the quasi-particles decay only slowly relative to other
relevant timescales (such as their time-of-flight) and when this criterion (and
similar ones) are easily met then quasi-particles are definitely present. When
plans etc. Dennett himself would embrace such claims (see Dennett (1987) for an extensive
discussion), and they are at least suggested by the functionalist program in philosophy of
mind which I discuss in section 7. However, for the purposes of this section there is no need
to resolve the issue: the computer can be taken only to ‘pseudo-plan’, ‘pseudo-believe’ and so
on, without reducing the explanatory importance of a description in such terms.
6Any solid-state textbook is replete with explanations of empirical phenomena which are
couched in terms of quasi-particles; see Kittel and Fong (1987), for instance.
7See the first chapter of Abrikosov, Gorkov, and Dzyaloshinski (1963) for a discussion.
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the decay rate is much too high, the quasi-particles decay too rapidly to behave
in any ‘particulate’ way, and the description becomes useless: hence we con-
clude that no quasi-particles are present. However, clearly it is a mistake to ask
exactly when the decay time is short enough (2.54 × the interaction time?) for
quasi-particles not to be present. What actually happens is that, as we lower
the decay time, the quasi-particle description becomes less and less advanta-
geous compared to a lower-level description in terms of crystal atoms — hence
by Dennett’s criterion it becomes less and less viable to regard them as real,
until ultimately they are clearly no longer of any use in studying the crystal and
we must either revert to the underlying description or look for another, more
useful higher-level distinction. But the somewhat blurred borderline between
states where quasi-particles exist and states where they don’t should not under-
mine the status of the quasi-particles as real — any more than the absence of a
precise point where a valley stops and a mountain begins should undermine the
status of the mountain as real.
(In fact, although this account of quasi-particles represents them as struc-
tures in an ontology of ‘real’ particles, the description in terms of nonrelativistic
particle mechanics is itself effective, and derives from a description in terms of
quantum field theory — there is every reason to believe particles like quarks
and electrons to be patterns in the underlying quantum field in almost exactly
the same sense that quasi-particles are patterns in the underlying crystal. It is
interesting to ask whether the existence of some underlying ‘stuff’ is essential,
or whether we can continue this chain of theories forever; such a question lies
beyond the scope of this paper, though.)
This view of higher-order ontology as pattern or structure has some con-
sequences which, though obvious given the nature of patterns, will play an
important role in the later discussion of quantum mechanics.
1. Patterns can be imprecise. As the quasi-particle example should illustrate,
a pattern can tolerate a certain amount of ‘noise’ or imprecision whilst still
remaining the same pattern. (A tiger which loses a hair is still the same
tiger). Beyond a certain point the noise is such that the pattern can no
longer be said to be present, but there is no reason to expect there to be
any precise point where this occurs. (It may sometimes be convenient to
define such a point by fiat: the biologist sometimes introduces an exact
moment when one species becomes another; the astrophysicist defines an
exact radius at which the sun’s atmosphere starts. But neither believes
that any deep truth is captured by this exactness.)
2. Patterns may involve dynamics, or be temporally extended. A ‘pattern’
in the sense I am using it need not be realised at an instant, but may
depend on the behaviour over some timescale of the constituents of a
pattern - what distinguishes a tiger from an inanimate facsimile of one is
the behaviour of the former, not its shape.
3. There is a concept of transtemporal identity for patterns, but again it
is only approximate. To say that a pattern P2 at time t2 is the same
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pattern as some pattern P1 at time t1 is to say something like “P2 is
causally determined largely by P1 and there is a continuous sequence of
gradually changing patterns between them” — but this concept will not
be fundamental or exact and may sometimes break down.
Before ending this section, I should acknowledge that my account is obviously
linked to the topic of how one theory can emerge from, or be reduced to, another
— and that this latter topic is highly controversial. Space does not permit
any detailed engagement with the extensive literature on the subject, but I
give here a few recent references: Butterfield and Isham (1999) give a general
discussion of emergence using time in quantum gravity as an example; Thalos
(1998) discusses the tension between physics and ‘higher-level’ sciences, in the
context of social science, and Auyang (1998) is concerned with the way in which
complex behaviour emerges from the interaction of simple systems; she uses
quasi-particles as an example, in fact. There is also some overlap with the
current debate on structural realism (proposed originally by Worrall (1989),
developed by, e. g. , Ladyman (1998), and criticised by, e. g. , Psillos (1995)).
5 Quantum theory in structural terms
In order to show how the ideas of the last section apply to quantum mechanics,
we consider the time-honoured problem of Schro¨dinger’s cat. Recall the situ-
ation: our unfortunate cat is locked in a box and at some time — let us say
noon — an unstable atomic nucleus is measured by a device within the box.
If the device finds the atom to be undecayed the cat lives, but if it finds that
it is decayed then poison gas is released into the box. If the atom’s state is
indefinite just before the measurement, then so is the cat’s state just after the
measurement.
Now, suppose that the cat is put into the box at 11am and we are asked to
predict what happens to it in the next hour. We do not know the wavefunction
of the cat at this point, and even if we did know it exactly it would be of little
use to us, for we cannot possibly solve the Schro¨dinger equation for such a com-
plicated system — nor can we even solve some sort of classical or semiclassical
approximation to it.
Nonetheless we can say useful things about the cat:
• from solid-state physics we can predict that the cat won’t spontaneously
vaporize;
• from animal physiology we can predict that the cat won’t spontaneously
die or grow a second tail;
• from cat psychology we can predict that the cat won’t start eating itself,
and will probably remain asleep for the whole hour.
It is because of the power of this cat-level description to tell us about the future
evolution of the wave-function, and because of the unavoidable need to work
at cat-level in considering that future evolution, that we say — via Dennett’s
criterion — that there is a cat present in the system.
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Now consider the evolution of the system after twelve noon, when the mea-
surement is made, but suppose that the atomic nucleus, instead of being in an
indefinite state, either definitely did or definitely did not decay. In each case,
to predict the system’s behaviour in the next hour, we use exactly the same
methods — e. g. , if the cylinder of poison gas breaks, then cat psychology tells
us that the cat will probably jump backwards, and animal physiology tells us
that it will die and in due course start to decompose.
Now, quantum mechanics is linear. If we know what happens if the atom
definitely does, or definitely does not, decay, then we can predict what happens
if we have a superposition of decaying and not decaying. However, in doing so
we are using exactly the same methods as before: we are taking advantage of
the patterns present in the two branches of the wave-function. In other words
— and this is the crucial point — in each of the branches there is a ‘cat’ pattern,
whose salience as a real thing is secured by its crucial explanatory and predictive
role. Therefore, by Dennett’s criterion there is a cat present in both branches
after measurement.8
Is it the same cat? Well, it is a future version of the same cat, in the sense
described in the previous section: i. e. , it is a pattern causally determined by
the original cat and linked to it by a continuously changing sequence of cat pat-
terns. It’s really just a matter of terminology whether we decide that the whole
branching set of living and dead cats ‘is the same cat’ (as defended in Tappen-
den 2000); the point to be learned, though, is that when describing patterns we
shouldn’t expect any more from transtemporal identity than approximate, ‘ef-
fective’ concepts which sometimes break down. (See Wallace (2001b) for further
discussion of identity over time in quantum mechanics.)
Another question which at first sight should have a precise answer: if there
was one cat before the measurement and two after it, when exactly did the
duplication of cats occur? But first sight is mistaken. Before the decay there
is certainly one cat. When the measurement occurs we will have a coherent
superposition of both measurement outcomes — but after a very short time
decoherence will remove the interference between these branches, and after this
time there will be two cats present. During the decoherence period the wave-
function is best regarded as some sort of ‘quantum soup’ which does not lend
itself to a classical description — but since the decoherence timescale τD is in-
credibly short compared to any timescale relevant at the cat level of description,
this need not worry us. Put another way, the cat description is only useful when
answering questions on timescales far longer than τD, so whether or not quan-
tum splitting is occurring, it just doesn’t make sense to ask questions about cats
that depend on such short timescales.
8If there are two cats, didn’t the mass of the universe just increase? It is easy to see
mathematically that this is not the case: the mass of the universe is a property of the universal
state, given by the expectation value of some ‘mass operator’ relative to that state. As such,
although we can quite happily talk about mass within a given branch, mass is simply not
additive across branches — any more than a superposition of two states each with energy E
does not have energy 2E. Analogously, a cat may have mass m in the morning and mass m
in the afternoon but the cat (regarded as a temporally extended object) still only has mass
m, not m+m. (I am grateful to Simon Saunders for this analogy).
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6 Superpositions of patterns
To see in a different way how the ideas of Sections 4-5 resolve the problem of
macroscopic indefiniteness, consider the following sketch of the problem.
1. After the experiment, there is a linear superposition of a live cat and a
dead cat.
2. Therefore, after the experiment the cat is in a linear superposition of being
alive and being dead.
3. Therefore, the macroscopic state of the cat is indefinite.
4. This is either meaningless or refuted by experiment.
But (1) does not imply (2). The belief that it does is based upon an oversim-
plified view of the quantum formalism, in which there is a Hilbert space of cat
states such that any vector in the space is a possible state of the cat. This is
superficially plausible in view of the way that we treat microscopic subsystems:
an electron or proton, for instance, is certainly understood this way, and any
superposition of electron states is another electron state.
But any state of a cat is actually a member of a Hilbert space containing
states representing all possible macroscopic objects made out of the cat’s sub-
atomic constituents. Because of Dennett’s criterion, this includes states which
describe
• a live cat;
• a dead cat;
• a dead dog;
• this paper . . .
We can say (if we want, and within nonrelativistic quantum mechanics9)
that the particles which used to make up the cat are now jointly in a linear
superposition of being a live cat and being a dead cat. But cats themselves are
not the sort of things which can be in superpositions. Cats are by definition
“patterns which behave like cats”, and there are definitely two such patterns in
the superposition.
The point can be made more generally:
It makes sense to consider a superposition of patterns, but it is
just meaningless to speak of a given pattern as being in a superposi-
tion.
9The situation is much more complicated in quantum field theory, where the particles
emerge in an effective way themselves and where particle number is not conserved. The only
exactly definable subsystem would be the field degrees of freedom in the spatial vicinity of the
cat, but this fails to allow for the fact that the cat might move out of that region. In QFT
even more than NRQM we are forced to a pattern concept of macroscopic systems.
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Thus, a pattern view of macroscopic ontology essentially solves the problem
of indefiniteness by replacing indefiniteness with multiplicity; since it does so
at the level of macroscopic objects including inanimate ones, it is closer in
spirit to a Many-Worlds approach than to a Many-Minds one. However, this
multiplication of patterns happens naturally within the existing formalism, and
does not need to be added explicitly to the formalism.
It is important to remain clear what macro-objects are patterns in: they are
not patterns in the positions of micro-objects, or in fundamental fields; they are
patterns in (the properties of) the quantum state. As mentioned in the footnote
on page 2, we can and do remain neutral about how this state is itself to be
interpreted, since all we need from it are its structural properties, such as: what
its representation is in the eigenbasis of a given operator. Of course, without
specification of some set of preferred operators the state is structureless (we can
say that it is a vector of unit norm in a countably-infinite-dimensional complex
Hilbert space, but that’s about it). The details of this specification depend on
the particular quantum theory with which we are working: in non-relativistic
quantum mechanics, for instance, they are given by the generators of the Gallilei
group for individual particles, whilst in quantum field theory they are given in
terms of the map between spacetime regions and operator algebras (see Wallace
(2001a, section 2.2) for a discussion).
As an aside, the analysis of this paper gives support to Deutsch’s claim
that the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory (Bohm 1952; Holland 1993) and its
variants are “parallel-universes theories in a state of chronic denial”(Deutsch
1996). In such theories10 the wave-function is supplemented by a collection of
‘corpuscles’, particles guided by the wave-function and supposed to define our
observed universe. But to predict the behaviour of the corpuscles we have to
predict the behaviour of the wave-function, and to predict the behaviour of the
wave-function we have to study the emergent patterns within it. Thus cats and
all other macro-objects can be identified in the structure of the wave-function
just as in the structure of the corpuscles. But the patterns which define them
are present even in those parts of the wave-function which are very remote from
the corpuscles. So if we accept a structural characterisation of macroscopic
reality, we must accept the multiplicity of that reality in the de Broglie-Bohm
pilot wave as much as in the Everettian universal state.
7 The role of the observer
We have not yet considered explicitly how observers are to fit into the frame-
work just described. However, if we are happy to extend Dennett’s criterion to
conscious observers, then they fit into the framework quite straightforwardly: if
a tiger is any pattern which behaves like a tiger, then an observer is any pattern
which behaves like an observer.
10I confine my attention here to those versions of the pilot-wave theory in which the wave-
function is taken to be physically real. Those versions in which only the corpuscles exist
are, in my view, in even greater denial, but I shall not argue the point here. (See Wallace
(forthcoming) for a discussion).
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This is essentially an expression of an established viewpoint in the philosophy
of mind: functionalism. Though there are many versions of functionalism, for
our purposes we can define it as follows.
The functionalist claim: As a matter of conceptual necessity,11
mental properties are supervenient on structural and functional prop-
erties of physical systems, and on no other properties. Hence, it
doesn’t matter what a brain is made of, only how it works.
Functionalism is at the root of the artificial intelligence project, for it entails
that any sufficiently accurate computer simulation of a conscious being will itself
be conscious. I will not attempt to defend it here, but will simply explore its
implications for quantum theory.12
Given functionalism, we can see that quantum mechanics implies the multi-
plication of observers in just the same way as it does the multiplicity of cats. To
see this in rather more detail, let us consider an idealised measurement of some
2-state system: the system is assumed to be measured in some basis (|1〉 , |2〉).
First consider the case where the 2-state system is actually in state |1〉, then the
observer’s state will remain definite after the measurement. Let’s suppose the
joint state of 2-state system and observer some time t after the measurement is
|ψt; 1〉 = |1〉⊗|f1(t)〉 , (2)
where f1(t) is some functional process describing the observer in the time fol-
lowing his observation of |1〉, and |f1(t)〉 (for varying t) is the sequence of states
realising that process. Similarly if the 2-state system is actually in state |2〉, the
joint state post-measurement will be
|ψt; 2〉 = |2〉⊗|f2(t)〉 . (3)
In accordance with comment (2) above, the states |f1(t)〉 and |f2(t)〉 describe
not just the observer, but an entire macroscopic region (where objects in that
region are defined in structural terms, as explained above).
Now let the 2-state system be in some superposition α |1〉+ β |2〉. Linearity
tells us that the overall state at time t must be
|ψt〉 = α |1〉⊗|f1(t)〉+ β |2〉⊗|f2(t)〉 . (4)
Now, each process f1(t), f2(t) describes (the mind of) an observer. The state
|ψt〉 realises both such processes; hence, it describes two observers (rather than
11The phrase ‘conceptual necessity’ is supposed to indicate that, according to functionalism,
mental properties are to be understood as by definition being present in systems with certain
functional properties. We can distinguish this from the weaker claim that, in fact, mental
properties are present in a system if and only if that system has certain functional properties;
much of what I will say goes through in this case also. See Chalmers (1996) for a recent
presentation of this weaker claim.
12See Lewis (1966) and Armstrong (1968) for two classic defences of functionalism; Dennett
(1991a) for a more recent defence; Block (1980), Chalmers (1996), Penrose (1989) and Searle
(1980) for a variety of criticisms; and Hofstadter and Dennett (1981) for a collection of articles
against and (mostly) for functionalism.
14
one observer in an indefinite state — whatever that might mean), and we have
again replaced superposition by multiplicity.13
We can see, then, that worries about observers with indefinite mental states
are as misplaced as worries about cats which are indefinitely alive or dead.
Patterns are not superposed, but duplicated, by the measurement event, and
ultimately we are regarding mental states as just special sorts of patterns (al-
though these patterns need not be visual patterns, realised in the instantaneous
physical state; rather, they are likely to be behavioural patterns, which describe
regularities in the dynamics of the physical state as well as its instantaneous
configuration — c. f. Dennett 1991b.)
We can also consider how our observer views the measurement event. In the
cases where the state of the system being observed had been definitely either
|1〉 or |2〉, the observer’s pre-measurement process (f0(t), let us say) would have
changed unproblematically into f1(t) or f2(t), and the observer would certainly
interpret this as personal survival: hence f0(t) and fi(t) describe the same
person. It is then legitimate for the observer to understand the measurement
as himself surviving as two diverging copies (of different weights) following the
measurement. (As Saunders (1998) has pointed out, this is closely analogous to
the cases of personal fission considered by Parfit (1984).)
(When is tempted to ask: What does it feel like while the split itself is oc-
curring? Hopefully it should be clear by now that this is a bad question: if
(as functionalism claims) statements about mental phenomena are statements
about the functional behaviour of the brain (i. e. , about the dynamical patterns
in it) and if the timescales on which the functional processes occur are very
long compared to the decoherence timescale (which they are) then there can be
no awareness of the event of splitting at all — thus allowing us to justify Ev-
erett’s famous claim to this effect (Everett 1957, p. 460). By analogy, suppose
an artificial-intelligence program were to be run on a (classical) digital com-
puter; it would be meaningless to ask what it felt like for that program whilst
the computer was in the process of changing from one digital configuration to
another. Understanding that process requires us to abandon the language of
computer programs and descend to the level of electronics, and ‘mental’ talk
about the computer or program doesn’t engage with that level.)
The approach advocated here also alleviates (though does not solve entirely)
the problem of probability in the Everett approach. An observer about to
measure a superposed state knows that after the measurement there will exist
more than one functional structure which he will regard as the same individual
13Note that my argument is rather different from that used by Chalmers (1996) to take
superposition into multiplicity. Chalmers proposes a principle (the ‘superposition principle’)
which effectively says that if conscious experience is present in one term of a superposition,
then it is present in the superposition; this was shown to be unworkable by Byrne and Hall
(1999). I make use only of the much weaker result (following from the functionalist criterion)
that a superposition of orthogonal states, each of which is determinately part of a sequence
of functional states, realises all the functional processes encoded by those sequences. This
in turn relies upon the existence of decoherence to give a preferred basis in which functional
sequences are possible; in this use of a preferred basis my approach is similar to that suggested
by Vaidman (2000) in his reply to Byrne and Hall.
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as himself. He has no reason not to care about their futures just as he cares
about ‘his own’ future, for even in the absence of splitting his future existence
consists only in the future presence of patterns such as these. But the different
future copies may have different interests which he could influence by actions
prior to the measurement; so how are these different interests to be weighted?
There is no a priori reason to weight them equally. Granted, we have not shown
that the ‘correct’ or ‘most rational’ weighting is the standard one, but we have
at least shown that it is rational for the observer to assign some weighting: in
other words, we have shown that there is room for probabilistic concepts (at
least the decision-theoretic sort) to be accommodated in the theory. This is
already enough to bring the Everett interpretation onto the same level as any
other physical theory, for — as pointed out in the quantum context by Papineau
(1996) — we have no really satisfactory understanding of probability in any
other context either! For more constructive attempts to justify the probability
rules, though (from a wide variety of perspectives) see Deutsch (1999), Saunders
(1998), Tappenden (2000), Vaidman (1998) and Zurek (1998).
It is worth remembering the crucial role that decoherence is playing in this
account: without it, we would not have the sort of branching structure which
allows the existence of effectively non-interacting multiple near-copies of a given
process. As it is, though, we are able to identify many different functional
structures realised in different parts of the universal state, each with the right
sort of complexity to merit the title ‘observer’.
Would it be possible to reject functionalism — that is, reject the applica-
tion of Dennett’s criterion to conscious observers — without having to reject
this paper’s ‘structural’ approach to quantum theory? Not necessarily, for func-
tionalism is neutral about how functional systems are to be realised physically,
whereas in this structural approach to quantum theory there is space for us to
require the system to be instantiated in a certain way — say, in the position
basis (although see Wallace (2001b) for the difficulties of this particular basis
choice). However, the structural approach is committed to an approach to the
mind which
• denies observers some uniquely special status, but describes them as emer-
gent as structures and patterns in lower-level physics (specifically, in lower-
level classical physics, itself to emerge from unitary quantum physics via
decoherence);
• is comfortable with some rough edges in the definition of which sys-
tems count as observers (for decoherence will never give us an exact
macroworld).
Functionalism fits these criteria in a very natural way.
8 Conclusions
In his critique of many-worlds interpretations, Kent (1990) states that
[W]e have tried to clarify the logical structure of the MWI . . . The
attempt may not have entirely succeeded. But we are convinced
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that the procedure is justified, and in fact that axiomatization should
have been insisted upon from the beginning. For any MWI worth the
attention of physicists must surely be a physical theory reducible to
a few definite laws, not a philosophical position irreducibly described
by several pages of prose.
It is not the purpose of this paper to argue against this view of physical theories.
I agree that physical theories should be axiomatizable, and in fact would say
that the axioms of any worthwhile Everettian theory should be just those of
‘bare’ unitary quantum mechanics, without axioms of measurement or collapse.
However, when we are describing observations, or cats, or people, within
physics, we inevitably need to make contact with higher-order theories — of
material science, of cat biology, of psychology and neuroscience. This contact
is not made by fiat, via abstractly or generally stated principles;14 rather, it
occurs because those theories are emergent from the microphysics, describing
patterns which occur within the microphysics. Indeed we do need several pages
of somewhat philosophical prose to describe carefully how this emergence takes
place — but the point is that having understood the process in the classical
case, there really is no reason to think anything different is going on in quantum
theory.
To summarise the view of quantum theory that then emerges:
• Macroscopic objects are to be understood as structures and patterns in
the universal quantum state.
• Multiplicity occurs at the level of structure — thus macroscopic objects
do not have indeterminate states after quantum measurements, but are
genuinely multiplied in number.
• We can tolerate some small amount of imprecision in the macroworld: a
slightly noisy pattern is still the same pattern. Hence we do not need to
worry that decoherence does not give totally non-interfering branches, just
very nearly non-interfering ones.
• There will be no precise answers to some questions (such as, ‘when did
the splitting take place?’), just very accurate ones.
• Other questions (such as those concerning transtemporal identity, or iden-
tity between objects across branches) will not always have good answers
at all, because they rely on concepts which though practically very useful,
sometimes break down.
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